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Abstract: 
 
This paper aims to show that, contrary to the standard understanding of his work, Sen’s 
idea of justice does not consist in the defense of a capability theory. Under the dominant 
capability-centered view, Sen’s idea of justice is indeed characterized principally by a 
switch of focus from utility to capability. We demonstrate that this view amounts to the 
application of formal welfarism to capabilities. We reject this characterization and defend 
instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen’s thought: capability was 
introduced to make a point against welfarism, but this does not imply that a commitment to 
a capability theory. The capability-centered view is shown to be inconsistent with Sen’s 
idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of their 
own welfare. Our study of the status of capability in Sen’s view of justice enables us to 
relocate his main contribution and to build the basis for an alternative theory of justice. 
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INTRODUCTION3 
“I have to rescue myself by saying [thumping table] ‘I’m not 
a capability theorist! For god’s sake, I’m not a capability theorist’” 
(Baujard, Gilardone and Salles forthcoming4). The apparent 
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disagreement between Amartya Sen and his commentators on the 
status of capability in his thought is puzzling. This paper challenges 
the dominant reading, here called the “capability-centered view”, 
according to which capabilities are at the core of Sen’s contribution 
to issues of justice (e.g., Gasper 2002, Pressman and Summerfield 
2002, Bénicourt 2007, Bonvin and Farvaque 2008, Robeyns and 
Brighouse 2010, Davis 2012). In the first step, we disentangle the 
main features of this disagreement, in order to be able, in the 
second step, to clarify the basis for an alternative theory of justice 
consistent with our reading. 
 
In our view, Sen has always striven to expand the debate on 
theories of justice. In the seventies he played a prominent role in 
shifting the debate from aggregation to the informational basis for 
justice: at a time when social choice theory and welfare economics 
considered justice solely through the aggregation problem, the issue 
of what is to be aggregated remained unaddressed. For this reason, 
Sen introduced the notion of the material. The material is the 
relevant informational basis for justice, i.e. the information used to 
measure individuals’ advantage, in order to assess, after proper 
aggregation, whether a social state is more just than another. In this 
respect, Sen defended the view that capabilities constitute a 
possible alternative material for justice instead of utility – as is the 
case in welfarist approaches, as he calls them. The capability 
approach Sen gave rise to is rooted in this defense. Very soon, it has 
conveyed the idea that the proper material for justice should be 
capability. Nevertheless, the approach Sen adopts is not in itself 
sufficient to constitute a capability theory of justice, since such a 
theory would require that capabilities are well-defined, as well as 
the aggregation procedure. Given his well-known reluctance to 
specify either of these, it is clear that Sen is not a capability theorist 
in this sense. But there is more to this which is worth highlighting. 
While some authors devote much effort to building an operational 
metric based on capabilities (e.g., Kuklys 2005), Sen strives to 
convince us that he does not want to get stuck with the concept of 
capability, and that we need to go beyond the issue of material in 
order to think about justice. Thus far, it seems, he has failed to make 
himself properly understood in this regard.  
This paper attempts to disentangle the different roles that 
capability may play in a theory. Through a careful reading of Sen’s 
works, it aims in particular to examine the status of capability in his 
contribution to justice issues and question the standard reading. We 
first recall how and why Sen introduced the concept of capability, 
alongside a presentation of the debate regarding his underspecified 
capability approach (Section 1). We demonstrate that capability 
plays a purely heuristic role in Sen’s view of justice: i.e., it is a step in 
a wider argument intended to open up the debate on justice, a 
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debate that previously had been stuck on the aggregation problem 
(Section 2). In the precise sense which we shall define, then, we 
establish that Sen is not a capability theorist. Taking seriously his 
refusal to provide lists of capabilities, we show that Sen’s view is 
immune to the usual criticism addressed at well-defined capability 
theories. This definitively undermines the capability-centered 
interpretation of Sen’s work (Section 3). Last, but not least, we 
argue that capability may be incompatible with Sen’s conception of 
justice, or may indeed not even be required by it at all (Section 4). 
We conclude our discussion with remarks on the peripheral 
status of capability in Sen’s contributions to justice and welfare 
issues. Specifically, we should not simply take it for granted that the 
concept of capability is central to Sen’s contribution to justice, 
considering the later as a mere shift of focus from utility to 
capability. Rather, thinking deeply about a theory of justice not only 
requires us to move beyond the aggregation issue, but also to move 
beyond the issue of material to value instead the process of 
identification of the material of justice. Although this paper does not 
aim to elaborate on Sen’s theory of justice, we assert that, rather 
than capabilities, the core of Sen’s theory is to be found in his 
conception of the role of public reasoning (e.g., Sen 2010: 242; 
Baujard, Gilardone and Salles forthcoming). Public reasoning 
pertains to how agents take part in collective discussion of public 
concerns, and requires that the political rules are justifiable or 
acceptable to all. The importance of public reasoning has already 
been noted by other authors (Qizilbach 2007, Gilardone 2013), as 
has the fact that Sen’s idea of justice is path-breaking (Peter 2012). 
To our knowledge, however, our paper is the first to suggest that 
this novel feature of Sen’s contribution cannot be properly 
understood in the absence of a primary step that consists in 
demonstrating that the capability-centered view is misconceived. 
1. The capability-centered view in question 
For nearly twenty years, debate has been ongoing in the secondary 
literature on the reasons why Sen left his capability approach 
underspecified (e.g. Gasper 1997, Deneulin 2002, Qizilbash 2002, 
Chakravorty 2003, Nussbaum 2003, Robeyns 2003). As a 
consequence, Sen’s account of capability is seen as an approach or a 
framework of thought, and not a theory of justice. What may be 
called the standard reading of Sen’s capability approach was 
introduced by Ingrid Robeyns: 
The capability approach is a framework of thought, a 
normative tool, but it is not a fully specified theory 
that gives us complete answers to all our normative 
questions. It is not a mathematical algorithm that 
prescribes how to measure inequality or poverty, 
nor is it a complete theory of justice. The capability 
approach, strictly speaking, only advocates that the 
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evaluative space should be that of capabilities. 
(Robeyns 2003: 64, our emphasis) 
Yet the publication of The Idea of Justice contradicts the 
common interpretation that Sen’s ambition is not to provide a 
theory of justice, since it sets itself up as an alternative to Rawls’s 
theory (Sen 2009: 410). The idea that Sen argues in favor of a 
capability approach in the sense just defined is also undermined. 
Sen does not insist on the capability space in his 2009 book, and – as 
we saw above – he has claimed he is not a capability theorist 
(Baujard, Gilardone and Salles forthcoming). First, then, we need to 
ask whether the apparent misunderstanding between Sen and his 
commentators is due simply to an evolution in the status Sen assigns 
to capability in his various contributions to justice issues. 
 
(i) It is well known that Sen’s development of the capability 
approach was originally motivated by a discontent vis-à-vis 
welfarism. Sen defined welfarism by reference to two features: the 
fact that well-being is identified by some subjective notion of utility, 
and an exclusive focus on well-being for measuring social welfare 
(Baujard, Gilardone and Salles forthcoming). Sen rejects both 
features of welfarism because he considers us as individuals to be 
“‘agents’ whose freedom to decide what to value and how to pursue 
what we value can extend far beyond our own interests and needs” 
(Sen 2009: 252). 
In contrast, welfarism requires considering individuals not as 
agents but merely as locations of utilities (Sen 1982a: 19). This 
conflicts with the intrinsic valuation of individuals’ agency (e.g., Sen 
1985a, 1993, 2006). An emphasis on agency considers individuals to 
be persons with the moral power to frame their own conception of 
the good. Because a focus on well-being is consequentialist, it is 
likely to violate agents’ relative values, and hence to downplay 
agents’ autonomy and deontology (Sen 1982b: 23). Imagine that 
utility was not exactly what a given individual thought should count 
for her well-being; or imagine that she pursued other goals apart 
from well-being, or had values which consisted in more than her 
own personal goals. In such cases, a welfarist policy conducted by 
some alien authority could favor her well-being but conflict with her 
agency. 
 
(ii) Sen introduces the concept of capability, and shows it is a better 
candidate than utility to evaluate individuals’ situation (e.g., Sen 
1982b, 1984, 1985b, 1992, 1993a, 1999, 2006, 2009; see also Peter 
2003 inter alia). 
A capability is an opportunity set and it is specific to a 
person. Person i’s “capability set [is] the set of functioning vectors 
within his or her reach” Sen (1985: 201), and among which this 
person will choose one particular functioning vector. Functionings 
refer to “various doings and beings that come into [the] 
assessment” (Sen 1985b: 197). For instance, a functioning vector 
would be the list: (i eats enough calories and calcium per day; i has a 
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direct access to water; i lives in her own house; i sleeps on the floor; 
i cannot read; … ); another functioning vector would be a similar list 
with different descriptions of each achievement, e.g., where i can 
now read but does not live in her own house. Choosing one 
functioning vector rather than another implies choosing a kind of 
living. Valuing capability rather than functionings implies valuing i’s 
choice of one kind of living per se – hence, freedom of choice rather 
than achievements. That is why we say capability stands for “the 
freedom to achieve actual livings that one can have reasons to 
value” (Sen 1999: 73). Capability thus appears as a better candidate 
than utility if, in addition to well-being, we are to respect freedom 
and agency. 
Since 1980, Sen has also insisted that his concept of 
capability is more relevant to defining the material of justice than 
Rawlsian primary goods. Although this comparison belongs to 
another line of arguments than those regarding utility, it reinforces 
the idea that capability is a better material for justice. Capability 
takes into account the heterogeneous transformation rates of 
resources into what is valuable to each individual. Personal 
characteristics, as well as social or environmental factors that are 
not necessarily a person’s responsibility, may greatly influence her 
ability to convert resources or primary goods into functionings, and 
hence her capability. For instance, if i is pregnant, she will need 
more calories and more calcium per day than a non-pregnant 
woman: focusing on the goods of providing calories and calcium is 
not informative about how well-fed this woman is, whereas the 
definition of functionings would focus on the achievements that are 
meaningful to her – “eat enough calories and calcium a day”. The 
capability approach avoids “fetishism of the goods”, because it does 
not consider goods to be valuable in themselves, but only as regards 
what they enable individuals to be or to do. 
As it also circumvents the drawbacks of subjective utility, 
capability succeeds in focusing on what persons can do or be; and it 
avoids assigning intrinsic importance to something else, whether 
that be utility or resources. 
 
(iii) The misunderstanding between Sen and his commentators 
might, perhaps, be explained by an evolution in Sen’s view regarding 
the role of capability in his argument. The ‘evolution explanation’ 
would thus assert the following: Sen did indeed first side with the 
capability-centered view, but realized in a second step that 
capability was vulnerable to criticism. In this story, commentators 
have become stuck on the first stage. Yet it seems to us that the 
ambiguity of his presentation of the importance of capability is still 
evident in his later contributions. In The Idea of Justice, the concept 
of capability appears in the table of contents in the titles of the third 
part, devoted to “the materials of justice” (notice the use of the 
plural). And if we look more closely, he does use the expression 
“change of focus” (e.g., Sen 2009: 254, footnote), which does not 
amount to the capability-centered view although it seriously 
supports it. Besides this, and as we shall describe more extensively 
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below, doubts about the capability-centered view are already 
evident in Sen’s first writings on the capability approach. As a result, 
therefore, we cannot accept that there is a sharp historical 
discontinuity regarding the status of capability in his writings. This 
calls out for further clarification of the status of capability in Sen’s 
idea of justice. 
2. Arguments in support of the heuristic view on 
capability 
We now propose a novel interpretation of the status of capability in 
Sen’s account of justice, which we call “the heuristic view”. A 
heuristic device is an assumption provisionally adopted as a 
guideline, regardless of its absolute truth. According to the heuristic 
view we here defend, Sen’s use of capability is simply a step in his 
argument against welfarism (or against resourcism). It is an 
argumentative step in a long demonstration which eventually issues 
in a theory of justice – although this intention was not evident from 
the outset. There does exist a better material for the framing of a 
theory of justice, namely capability; but this does not imply that 
capability is the best material, nor that it constitutes the complete 
guide to justice. 
 
(i) Firstly, we offer a logical argument in favor of the heuristic view: 
better does not imply best. 
The standard interpretation defends the claim that 
capability is the material which Sen suggests we should substitute 
for utility in thinking about public policies and assessing social 
states. Sen himself develops arguments supporting the so-called 
“change of focus” in his second Dewey Lecture, “Well-being and 
Freedom” (Sen 1985a: 185-203). If we take quotations out of 
context and ignore nuances, Sen certainly seems to express the view 
that capability and functionings are a better way to consider well-
being than utility (Sen 1985a: 195-203). But consider, now, the 
whole text in which the demonstration is set out. The explicit aim of 
this lecture is to propose a critical examination of the informational 
basis of utilitarianism, which is supposed to show that utility is not 
the best way to see well-being (Sen 1985a: 185). He concludes that 
functionings and capability may be a better material for justice than 
utility. This assertion does not have as a logical consequence that 
functionings or capabilities are good materials for justice, nor that 
they are the only suitable materials for justice. This remains to be 
proved. 
When Sen introduces capability, he does so not to defend 
capability per se but rather to undermine welfarism – as he explicitly 
says. Yet undermining welfarism is only a step in an argument 
towards something else. 
 
(ii) Secondly, we cite textual evidence in favor of the heuristic view. 
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A careful reading of Sen’s texts on capability establishes that 
his argument in favor of capability is sometimes accompanied by a 
specification of how to understand it. He specifies that capability is 
something which proves to be better than utility in certain respects, 
and which avoids the failures of a resourcist framework. Given that 
there exists a better material than utility, he remarks, the 
dominance of utility should be questioned. Sen’s first introduction of 
the concept of capability is clear in this regard: 
This [rejecting the claims of utilitarian equality, total 
utility equality, and Rawlsian equality to provide a 
sufficient basis for the equality aspect of morality] is 
my main thesis. I have also made the constructive 
claim that this gap can be narrowed by the idea of 
basic capability equality, and more generally by the 
use of basic capability as a morally relevant 
dimension taking us beyond utility and primary 
goods. I should end by pointing out that the validity 
of the main thesis is not conditional on the 
acceptance of this constructive claim. (Sen 1980: 
220)  
This excerpt shows that Sen’s main thesis in the first 
presentation of the capability approach was indeed to demonstrate 
the irrelevance of the welfarist framework. According to our 
reading, the concept of capability, set in opposition to utility, and to 
Rawls’s (1971) proposed candidate – primary goods –, is an 
additional argument intended to undermine welfarism. Again, we 
insist that it does not hold that the better material is the best 
material. Indeed, the “basic capability equality” is not considered by 
Sen (Ibid.) to be “the sole guide to the moral good”: there could be 
other morally relevant claims to take into account in equality 
judgments, and also in other types of moral judgments of social 
states. 
There is another kind of textual evidence relevant here: the 
concept of capability is not mentioned in some important 
contributions on Sen’s idea of justice. If capability were the core of 
Sen’s idea of justice, the concept would appear in most of them. For 
instance, in “What Do We Want From a Theory of Justice?”, Sen 
(2006) does not elaborate on capability. Even in the context of the 
first Mahbub ul Haq Memorial Lecture of the Human Development 
and Capability Association, Sen (2008) does not devote much space 
to capability. While Sen (2008: 334) highlights above all “the 
importance of looking at human lives themselves, rather than at the 
commodity possessions and other facilitating factors that have some 
influence over our lives”, it is worth noting that the same paragraph 
ends with a statement which seems to close the debate: “The 
distinction here has, by now, been much discussed in the literature 
and its implications have been widely explored in the contributions 
of many economists, social scientists and philosophers” (Ibid.). 
Indeed, the rest of Sen’s lecture is devoted to other features of 
Sen’s idea of justice. This corroborates our heuristic view of Sen’s 
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capability approach, according to which it is designed to provide 
elements of a debate within welfare economics, and so to broaden 
its methods and objects. 
 
(iii) Thirdly, there are arguments against the claim that Sen 
supports the capability theory as the unique alternative theory of 
justice. 
In considering the status of the capability approach, Sen 
never refers to a theory. He refers to an approach or a perspective, 
whose scope is restricted (Sen 2004, 2005, 2009). For instance he 
writes, “the capability perspective has some obvious merits […] This 
does not entail that the most fruitful focus of practical attention 
would invariably be measures of capability” (Sen 1999: 81). Or, that 
the capability approach “does not cover all the territory of justice, in 
which process considerations, including liberty and procedural 
equity, figure” (Sen 2005: 157). Capability points towards a certain 
informational focus but does not define a theory of justice (Sen 
2009: 232). As a result, the capability approach at least stands in 
need of completion. It is not sufficient as it stands to constitute a 
theory of justice.  
Not only must the capability approach be completed if it is 
to become a theory of justice, but many textual arguments also 
testify to Sen’s dissatisfaction with the capability approach as it 
stands. Among other points, he claims that 1) there can be tensions 
between “well-being freedom” and “agency freedom”; 2) the 
approach’s inherent incompleteness and ambiguities will sometimes 
make it impossible to settle on a clear evaluation; 3) rival reasoning 
or other criteria may have a role to play in the diagnosis of injustice 
for moral reasons (Sen 2009: 295–98). This dissatisfaction is 
inconsistent with the capability-centered view, yet it is clearly 
consistent with our heuristic view.  
 
As a preliminary conclusion, then, we remark that Sen’s view 
of justice does not confine itself to the capability-centered view. Sen 
uses the capability approach as a heuristic device to show that there 
is a material which is possibly better than utility (or than resources 
as primary goods) to think about justice, not that capability is the 
only way nor the proper way to do so. Though it is clear in Sen’s 
presentations, this nuanced role for the capability approach in his 
idea of justice is a reading that, to our knowledge, has never been 
explicitly established. 
3. The inconsistency of the capability-centered view with 
Sen’s idea of justice 
On the heuristic view, the introduction of capability 
constitutes a step in the argument to undermine welfarism, rather 
than being a conclusion in a defence of a unique alternative to 
welfarism. Yet the heuristic view by itself does not imply the 
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rejection of the conclusion that capability should be substituted for 
utility, as is maintained by the capability-centered view. To fully 
invalidate the capability-centered view, we need to establish that it 
is inconsistent with Sen’s idea of justice. This will be achieved by 
showing that Sen’s capability approach is immune to serious 
criticisms addressed at capability theories – criticisms based on 
considerations of paternalism and the problem of 
operationalization. According to our reading, such criticisms pose 
major problems for capability-centered theories, but do not concern 
Sen’s view. 
 
(i) Aside from its affirming the capability approach, what, in the end, 
is a capability theory of justice? We think that the “formal welfarist 
framework” introduced by social choice theorists captures the 
specific nature of what is today perceived as being a theory of 
justice in economics (e.g., Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson, 2005). 
In the formal welfarist framework, social states are ranked on the 
basis of the assessment of social welfare, and social welfare results 
from the aggregation of individual advantages in the social state 
under consideration. This general theory of justice may have many 
interpretations. 
For instance, utilitarianism says that individual utilities are 
the appropriate measure of individual advantage, and the utilitarian 
social welfare function is the sum of all individual utilities. Hence the 
utilitarian theory of justice is characterized by the identification of a 
specific material at the individual level – utility – and by a specific 
form of aggregation of such individual utilities – the sum. The 
specificity of any theory of justice of this kind is thus captured by 
two distinct stages: the definition of individual advantage, i.e., of the 
relevant material for social justice, on the one hand, and the 
identification of one kind of aggregation, on the other. The obtained 
ranking of social states is informative as regards the selection of a 
policy that fits the defined theory of justice. 
We are used to saying that if the material is utility, the 
theory is welfarist. According to the capability-centered view, Sen 
defends the replacement of utility by capability, and using capability 
as an alternative material in a theory of justice is non-welfarist. 
Nevertheless, the formal welfarist framework, broadly 
speaking, is still compatible with the capability-centered view, 
where capability is simply substituted for utility (Blackorby, Bossert 
and Donaldson 2005, Iwata 2013, Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013). In 
such a case, capability is the information which captures a proper 
notion of individual welfare; it is then aggregated at the collective 
level, and from this we can derive a social welfare function. A 
capability theory is totally defined once the two stages are defined. 
Firstly, one needs a measurable definition of capabilities, suitable to 
identify the elements of the functioning vectors or to specify a list of 
capabilities. Secondly, one needs to determine the kind of 
aggregation: e.g., should one maximize the sum of individuals’ 
capabilities, use the leximin rule, etc.? 
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Yet, contrary to this, Sen insists in not providing any 
description of these two stages. We cannot simply endorse the idea 
that Sen’s capability approach is underspecified; rather, we want to 
take Sen’s arguments seriously when he refuses to provide a list or 
aggregative principle. 
 
(ii) In any capability theory there must be, at least in 
principle, a list of capabilities. Furthermore, some take for granted 
that a list of capabilities is required as soon as one commits oneself 
to the capability approach (e.g., Carter 2014: 78–79), and 
accordingly develop critical arguments against it. Consider two 
alternative functionings x and y – e.g., standing respectively for 
“having a job” and “taking care of your sick mother”. Suppose at 
least two agents A and B in a population. A, in charge of 
implementing a policy, has established a list of capabilities and has, 
for example, decided that y is not valuable and that x is valuable, 
such that y is not part of this list, while x is on the list. As a 
consequence, no policy shall promote the availability of y, while 
some policies shall promote the availability of x to B. Through the 
better availability of x and, as a corollary, the lesser availability of y, 
B is encouraged to choose x because of A’s judgment on the 
situation, regardless of B’s judgment. A is thus paternalist as regards 
to B, because A is a stakeholder in the restriction of the list of 
capabilities while B is not. The establishment of a restricted list of 
valued capabilities by an evaluator (e.g. a policy-maker) A is 
therefore paternalist towards B in this respect. All arguments to the 
effect that the capability approach is paternalist are based on the 
assumption of the existence of a list – a capability theory is 
paternalist because it provides a well-defined list whether for justice 
evaluation or policy making. We claim that these arguments are 
serious for capability theories, and thus do have serious implications 
for the capability-centered view, but they are of little relevance for 
Sen’s use of capability. 
 
Sen is conscious that framing a list of capabilities would be 
interpreted as the imposition of a comprehensive notion of the good 
life (e.g., Sen 1987, 1992: 82–83, 2004: 80). In contrast to Martha 
Nussbaum, who has developed a full theory of justice with a list of 
central and universal capabilities at its core,5 Sen refuses to assume 
the role of an Aristotelian philosopher. Instead, he suggests that 
individuals themselves, in so far as they are involved in public 
reasoning, should be part of the process of the definition of the 
good life: 
The connection between public reasoning and the 
choice and weighting of capabilities in social 
                                                          
5
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necessary for a life to be truly human (Nussbaum 1999: 39). This constitutes a 
definition of the material of justice. She also provides a rule of aggregation when 
she claims that every individual should have access to all the capabilities on her list. 
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assessment is important to emphasize. It also points 
to the absurdity of the argument that is sometimes 
presented, which claims that the capability 
approach would be usable – and ‘operational’ – only 
if it comes with a set of ‘given’ weights on the 
distinct functionings in some fixed list of relevant 
capabilities. The search for given, pre-determined 
weights is not only conceptually ungrounded, but it 
also overlooks the fact that the valuations and 
weights to be used may reasonably be influenced by 
our own continued scrutiny and by the reach of 
public discussion. (Sen 2009: 242) 
In Sen’s view, it matters who is choosing (or participating in 
the choice of) the material for evaluation. If the individuals whose 
lives shall be assessed are part of the decision, the process is not 
paternalist. For instance, if in our previous example A = B, B’s views 
will obviously be respected; and if A is different than B but asks B to 
participate in the decision-making process, B’s will is not violated. 
But if A alone is establishing a list that is to be applied to assess B’s 
quality of life, then the process is indeed paternalist.  
The use Sen makes of capabilities in social evaluation has 
always been conditioned by a “social choice exercise”, requiring 
“public discussion”, and seeking “democratic understanding and 
acceptance” to arrive at a “consensus” on weights – all the while 
allowing that this “democratic search for agreement […] can be 
extremely messy” (Sen 1999: 78–79). Hence, his defense of 
capabilities cannot be judged paternalist; it does not conflict with 
the principle of equal respect for persons, i.e., with treating agents 
as ends in themselves (e.g., Carter 2014: 82, Dworkin 2014: 10). 
Above all, it is meant to respect agency. 
 
(iii) Despite this, the literature has too often focused on the 
lack of a list and the so-called problem of operationalization that it 
entails. Many authors have indeed offered damning judgments on 
the fact that Sen does not provide any elements with which to 
operationalize his capability approach (Sugden 1993, Nussbaum 
2003, Robeyns 2003, Comim et al. 2008). If the capability-centered 
view held, there would indeed be no reason why Sen should stop his 
reasoning at this point and leave aside the issue of 
operationalization. Obviously, there is something to be learnt here. 
Sen not only refuses to provide definitive keys for the material and 
the aggregation issues; in fact, he does not consider the 
operationalization criticism to be relevant at all:  
I don’t know what ‘operationalize’ means. It is like 
saying, “Mr Mill, I understand what you are saying 
about liberty but how are we going to operationalize 
the demands of liberty? It was what Ryle would call 
a “category mistake”. A subject like capability, it’s 
not a formula, it’s pointing towards a certain space. 
So it’s like saying “How would you operationalize 
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this space?” and I would say “Come again. What do 
you mean?” I’m saying this – the capability space – is 
a relevant space in a way that the utility space is not, 
the commodity space is not. That’s it. I’ve 
operationalized it: I’ve told you what to look for. I 
don’t have to end up by saying that the square root 
of the capability index obtained in this way has to be 
added to the cube root of something else. […] That’s 
what most people mean, when they come and ask 
how you’re going to operationalize capability. I just 
say, “I don’t really understand what the question is 
about”. (Baujard, Gilardone and Salles forthcoming) 
Sen is particularly vehement in this regard: indeed, the 
subject appears to be a matter of real irritation for him. He 
describes attempts at operationalization as a “category mistake”. 
Why? In reply, we claim that the novelty of Sen’s idea of justice and 
his contribution to theories of justice is not exclusively concerned 
with the material of justice, whether that be capability properly 
identified, refined functionings, or any other material. It lies 
primarily in the character of the process we engage in to define this 
material. The aim, as we have seen, is to give individuals a voice in a 
way which circumvents the violation of autonomy and avoids 
paternalism. Agents should participate in determining their fate by 
being part of a process of public reasoning which is valued per se; 
whereas “‘operationalization’ is a demand to get to solutions 
without thinking, without discussing, without debating” (Baujard, 
Gilardone and Salles forthcoming). As Sen concludes:  
Well, you have to ask what the relevant capabilities 
are and how you can have public reasoning about 
how to value them. And the public reasoning that 
happens in France may well be different from that 
elsewhere, given the history of the debate. It may 
favor, for example, state education in a way that the 
United States may not, and you could respect the 
reasoning in each case. I will not use the word 
‘operationalizing’, I would say instead that in each 
case you will come out with a solution of some kind. 
I think this is a good system. (Baujard, Gilardone and 
Salles forthcoming) 
This discussion of the operationalization of the capability 
approach confirms that the most important aspect for Sen is not 
capability but rather the process through which public decisions are 
made, highlighting in particular the role of individuals in public 
reasoning. This is a definitive argument in favor of the priority of 
public reasoning over capabilities. A consequence of this argument 
is that Sen’s contribution to justice should not be remembered for a 
capability theory but something very different: a theory of human 
agency and public reasoning, both being intimately related. 
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4. The possible consistency of Sen’s idea of justice with a 
material other than capability 
To complete our demonstration that the capability-centered view is 
inconsistent with Sen’s idea of justice, we will now show that the 
focus on capability itself is likely to be incompatible with it, whereas 
an alternative material is likely to be compatible. In other words, we 
claim that we are directed toward a theory of justice that is not 
necessarily a capability theory. 
 
(i) In our view, the prominence of the debate on the difference 
between Sen and Nussbaum is responsible for having drawn too 
much attention to the list problem, and thus for hiding another 
essential element of Sen’s position: the problem of there being any 
pre-established material at all. 
This takes us back to the issue of paternalism, and to the 
related issue of the “container view”, developed after the famous 
Rawlsian argument in favor of the separateness of persons (Rawls 
1971: 26–27). If what is really being valued in a theory of justice is 
not the individual person B per se, but just that B is the container of 
B’s utility, then B is not being treated as an agent nor as an end in 
itself. The same holds for any capability theory in which individuals 
are considered only through their capabilities. Like welfarism, the 
focus on capability violates autonomy and equal respect of persons 
in so far as it is determined a priori that capability is the only 
material that will be counted. 
Imagine that an expert decided that capability was the 
proper material for a theory of justice. Even if the definition and the 
measure of capability were eventually decided through public 
reasoning, by including the persons who would be affected by the 
evaluation, the chosen material has still been imposed by some 
external expert and reflects her own view of the good. This 
implementation thus does not involve agents in the definition of the 
proper notion of the good, and may not respect the actual aims that 
individuals have reasons to value. Hence the implementation of this 
capability approach may be incompatible with the core of Sen’s idea 
of justice – at least as we perceive it. 
 
(ii) As we noted in section 2, Sen (2009: 298) considers that, for 
moral reasons, rival reasoning or other criteria may have a role to 
play in the diagnosis of injustice. And this is not a new argument. In 
1999 he explicitly developed the idea that the capability perspective 
always has to be compared with rival perspectives, if it is to be used 
fruitfully in public reasoning:  
[…] since it is not claimed that the capability 
perspective exhausts all relevant concerns for 
evaluative purpose (we might, for example, attach 
importance to rules and procedures and not just to 
freedoms and outcomes), there is the underlying 
issue of how much weight should be placed on the 
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capabilities, compared with any other relevant 
consideration. (Sen 1999: 77) 
Public reasoning over competing views is not a necessary 
component of the capability-centered view, but it has a key role to 
play in Sen’s idea of justice, including in the definition of the 
material of justice. And Sen (1999: 77) explicitly criticizes the 
exclusive focus on capability – the very thing we have called the 
capability-centered view: “To insist on the mechanical comfort of 
having just one homogenous ‘good thing’ would be to deny our 
humanity as reasoning creatures”.  
 
(iii) Let us now confirm that the adoption of a material distinct from 
capability may still be compatible with Sen’s idea of justice, in the 
sense we have here reconstructed. 
Suppose that we have undergone a process of defining a 
material through the true participation of each agent in public 
reasoning. Now imagine that this deliberation has resulted in our 
picking the following alternative material: utility of a certain 
threshold, in addition to freedoms.6 In a refined version of a similar 
idea, we value not only capability but also the actual utility 
associated with the functionings achieved thereby. In other words, 
such a material is a recipient of two distinct values, freedom and 
utility, captured respectively by capability, and a certain value of 
functionings. This material does not coincide with capability per se, 
and attributing a value to this material is not consistent with the 
capability approach in so far as capability unquestionably excludes 
the instrumental value of freedom – or, to put it differently, it 
excludes the intrinsic importance of utility (Fleurbaey and Blanchet 
2013: 223–25). Yet there is a great deal of textual evidence to 
support the view that this example is likely to capture Sen’s own 
values: he clearly attributes some importance to utility besides 
freedom – e.g., “The importance of freedom and of opportunity 
would be hard to motivate if the focus were not on the options or 
processes that one has reasons to value or want, but rather on 
alternatives one has no reason to seek” (Sen 2002: 5).  
With the proviso that this has emerged through a process in 
which each agent was fully involved in public reasoning, the focus 
on both utility and capability rather than on only the second is 
consistent with Sen’s usual positions. A material distinct from 
capabilities may hence be compatible with the core of Sen’s idea of 
justice. 
 
It is clear to us that capability may not be sufficient to 
capture a notion of agency-freedom since it requires taking into 
                                                          
6
 In the freedom of choice literature, it is standardly shown to be impossible to 
attribute a value to utility and to freedom meanwhile. For a discussion of whether it 
is formally and conceptually possible to derive proper judgments over social states 
based on these two distinct values, see Baujard (2011). For an axiomatic description 
of one possible solution with threshold, see Baujard and Gaspart (2004). 
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consideration “the process through things happen” (Sen 2002: 585), 
and not only the opportunity set available to each individual. In 
other words, if we take agency seriously, the processes by which 
agents reach social states may be crucial information for any 
evaluation. But Sen goes further in his account of agency-freedom, 
and, on our reading, this is the primary reason why we should see 
the core of justice theories as rooted in public reasoning. Indeed, 
the importance of process and agency seems to fade away if agents 
are excluded from the process of decision-making as regards the 
evaluation of social states. We may thus claim that process should 
trump the focus on material. 
Conclusion 
We have shown that Sen does not suggest that we should 
substitute capability, in whichever version, for utility, such that the 
dialectic stops there. There is simply no such thing as “Sen’s metric”. 
 
According to the capability-centered view, the core of Sen’s 
idea of justice is to support the focus on capability as the proper 
material of justice, irrespective of what process of aggregation is 
employed at the second stage. This view is not only widespread, but 
indeed remains almost unquestioned. Sen himself has expressed 
regret that he has been “stuck” with the capability approach by his 
readers, and incorrectly tagged as a capability theorist. It is also fair 
to say that his writings are confusing in this regard, and that the 
more profound proposition we feel he offers is too simply lost in the 
fog. We want to rescue the latter from this trap, not least because 
the dominant capability-centered view is inhibiting fundamental and 
much-needed progress in welfare and justice theories. This paper 
has striven to undermine the standard capability-centered view in 
four steps in order to propose a consistent basis for an alternative 
thinking about justice.  
First, we presented the elements of the debate over the 
capability-centered view. Sen introduced capability notably because 
it can deal with agency better than utility or primary goods. This 
defense, we showed, is not simply a trace of an old theory of justice 
which Sen has since abandoned; it is rather a step in the argument 
to introduce agency into considerations of justice. 
Second, we supported the heuristic view, according to which 
the status of capability in Sen’s idea of justice is a heuristic device 
and the focus on capability constitutes just a step in an argument 
directed at framing a theory of justice, but not a conclusion. The 
introduction of the capability approach succeeded in showing that 
there undoubtedly exists a better material than subjective utility, 
and made the first necessary step to undermine welfarism (and 
similarly to undermine resourcism). However, this argument does 
not imply that capability is the best material for a theory of justice. 
At this stage, then, we still needed to show that answering 
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questions about the material does not suffice to lay the foundations 
for a theory of justice. 
Third, we defined precisely what a fully spelled-out 
capability theory would be. Based on the formal welfarist 
framework, capability theory supposes that there are well-defined 
lists of capabilities, and well-defined aggregation rules. In this 
connection, we addressed the paternalism criticism addressed at 
the capability approach and showed it does not undermine Sen’s 
idea of justice, but rather targets capability theory itself. A decision 
is paternalist if it is made in the interest of but not necessarily 
according to the will of the agent concerned. Any capability theory is 
likely to be paternalist, then, because it appeals to well-defined lists 
drawn up by external experts. On the contrary, however, Sen’s focus 
on the involvement of agents in public reasoning in general, and in 
particular in public decisions aimed at defining the proper material, 
allows his idea of justice to avoid criticisms of paternalism. Thus the 
operationalization criticism reflects a profound misunderstanding of 
Sen’s enterprise. His refusal to provide lists is not just about passing 
the buck. Rather, Sen requires that any lists or decisions concerning 
the assessment of states should arise from the concerned agents 
involved in public reasoning, rather than from third-party 
researchers, however well qualified.  
Fourth, we established that the capability-centered view is 
inconsistent with Sen’s idea of justice as we conceive it. On the one 
hand, the exclusive focus on capability is problematic. Even without 
a well-defined list, the commitment to the capability approach 
supposes a focus on capability rather than any other material. This 
would be compatible with Sen’s idea of justice if it emanated from 
the concerned people and was arrived at by public reasoning, but it 
would be incompatible if it were decided upon by external experts. 
On the other hand, we can find candidate materials other than 
capability which are consistent with Sen’s views of justice, on the 
proviso that the process behind the public decision respects agency 
and public reasoning.  
As a result, we take it to have been proven that the core of 
Sen’s theory does not lie in the definition of the proper material. It 
most definitely lies elsewhere, and certainly assigns an essential role 
to the process by which this material is defined, such that this 
process should be characterized by the involvement of the agents 
concerned in public reasoning. 
 
The goal of this paper was to state as definitively as possible 
what Sen’s idea of justice is not: Sen’s theory of justice is not a 
capability theory. All the same, we must be clear that this analysis 
does not imply that capability is irrelevant as a material. Capability 
may prove to be an important part of the informational basis for 
justice, and is indeed likely to be so, though only on the proviso that 
its relevance and its content has been defined by agents through 
engagement in public reasoning. But to a mind haunted by the 
specter of capability, any presentation of Sen’s idea of justice is 
likely to be misunderstood. Our clarification was thus a necessary 
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preliminary step before we could discuss Sen’s thoughts about 
justice in a manner free of bias. An obvious subsequent step would 
be description and analysis of the link between human agency and 
public reasoning, thus further expounding Sen’s actual theory by 
gaining closer insight into its content and its justificatory 
procedures. This cannot but be the subject of a distinct paper. 
To conclude, we remark that Sen’s theory of justice is 
fundamentally democratic. His theory thus stands in opposition to a 
certain tendency in the academic community to hand all 
responsibility over to the community of philosophers and 
economists, in order to define what welfare is or should be, to 
compute it and on this basis provide policy recommendations which 
are in line with the public interest so conceived. What Sen is striving 
to do – according to our reconstruction – is an important departure 
from the traditional framework of welfare economics: agents should 
be involved not just by voting for their representatives, but in the 
actual process of deciding how their lives should be conducted and 
evaluated. Subject to the proviso of our reading, Sen’s theory is 
therefore a major contribution as regards the introduction of 
democracy into the realm of economic expertise and social welfare. 
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